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State v. Davis: Peremptory Strikes and Religion-The
Unworkable Peremptory Challenge Jurisprudence*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In State v. Davis 1 the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that a
religiously motivated peremptory challenge was not a violation of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In doing so, it
failed to extend the United States Supreme Court's recent peremptory
challenge jurisprudence, which has consistently extended defendants' and
jurors' equal protection rights, to its next logical step. 2
This note will argue that the Minnesota Supreme Court erred in its
analysis by refusing to apply the Supreme Court's logic to religiously
motivated peremptory challenges. In Parts II and III this note will
discuss the background and facts of the Davis decision. Part IV will
explain the method the Minnesota Supreme Court used in deciding the
case. Part V will discuss problems with the Minnesota Supreme Court's
reasoning in not extending the Batson v. Kentuckyl prohibition against
racially based peremptory challenges to religiously based challenges.
Additionally, Part V will argue that, although the Minnesota Supreme
Court erred when it refused to prohibit religiously motivated challenges,
the United States Supreme Court peremptory challenge jurisprudence is

* Copyright <e> 1995 by D. Scott Crook.
1. 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993).
2. The Supreme Court has slowly increased the scope of the equal protection clause
over jury selection procedures. See generally Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879)
(holding that the equal protection clause precludes state from limiting juror selection pool to
white males only); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (holding that the equal protection
clause protects defendant if the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenge persistent! y to
exclude jurors of the defendant's race from previous juries); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
( 1986) (holding that the equal protection clause allows defendant to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination based on suspect peremptory challenges by prosecution in defendant's voir
dire only); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that the equal protection clause
allows defendant to assert juror's equal protection rights when prosecutor's peremptory strikes
are suspect even if the defendant and juror are of a different race); Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (holding that the equal protection clause protects juror's
and litigant's equal protection rights in civil cases because attorneys are state actors); Georgia
v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (holding that the equal protection clause precludes
defense attorneys from making race based peremptory strikes); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct.
1419 (1994) (holding that the equal protection clause precludes gender-based peremptory
challenges).
3. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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illogical and unmanageable. This note contends that a return to the standards established in Batson would bring more legitimacy and
manageability to the Court's peremptory challenge jurisprudence and
would have allowed the Minnesota Supreme Court to reach the same
result it reached in Davis without making unreasonable conclusions.
II.

BACKGROUND

The Supreme Court first applied equal protection to jury selection
procedures in Strauder v. West Virginia. 4 Strauder was a black man who
had been indicted for murder. 5 The state statute defining the jury
selection pool precluded black men from being selected as jury members. 6 Strauder argued that this preclusion violated his equal protection
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 The Supreme Court agreed
and held "that the statute ... discriminat[ed] in the selection of jurors
... against negroes because of their color, [which] amount[ed] to a
denial of the equal protection of the laws to a colored man when he is put
upon trial. " 8
Almost one hundred years later, the issue of whether race based
peremptory challenges constituted a violation of the equal protection
clause reached the Supreme Court in Swain v. Alabama. 9 The Swain
case involved a black defendant who had been indicted for robbery. 10
During the voir dire, the prosecutor exercised his peremptory strikes
against all of the black jurors in the jury pool. 11 Swain claimed that the
peremptory challenges constituted discrimination in the jury selection
process and that this discrimination violated his equal protection rights. 12
The Court held against the defendant but concluded that if "a prosecutor,
... in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime,
and whoever the defendant or victim may be, is responsible for the
removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors, " 13 his
behavior creates a presumption that the peremptory challenges violate the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 14

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

100 u.s. 303 (1879).
ld. at 304.
Id.
Id.
ld. at310.
380 u.s. 202 (1965).
ld. at 203.
ld. at 210.
I d.
ld. at 223.
ld. at 224.
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In Batson v. Kentucky, Is the Court revisited the peremptory
challenge issue. Batson, a black man, had been indicted for robbery and
receipt of stolen goods. 16 During the course of the voir dire, the
prosecutor excused all four remaining black jurors with peremptory
challenges. Batson contended that his Fourteenth Amendment right to
equal protection had been violated. 17 The court held that a defendant
could establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the peremptory
challenge context by establishing that he or she "is a member of a
cognizable racial group, and [that] the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's
race. " 18 Further, the defendant should realize that the peremptory
challenge allows people who wish to discriminate the opportunity to do
so. 19 Additionally, the Court required that "the defendant must show
that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference
that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen . . . on
account of . . . race. " 20 The Court then held that "the burden shifts to
the State to come forward with a neutral explanation" 21 for the peremptory challenge. The Court's decision tempered the more stringent Swain
requirement that the defendant prove a consistent historical pattern of
prosecutorial discrimination in peremptory challenges.
The Court continued to broaden the rights of the defendant to
challenge race based peremptory challenges in Powers v. Ohio. 22
Powers, a white man indicted for murder, challenged the prosecutor's six
peremptory strikes that excluded all black venirepersons from the jury. 23
The Supreme Court held that the jurors' equal protection rights had been
violated24 and that the defendant had standing to sue on behalf of the
juror.zs
While the previous cases were all criminal cases, in Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co. ,26 the Court extended the prohibition against race
based peremptory challenges to civil litigants. Edmonson was a black
litigant suing Leesville Concrete for negligence relating to a job-site

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

476 U.S. 79 (1986).
at 82.
at 83.
at 96 (citation omitted).
(citing Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
/d.
/d. at 97.
499 U.S. 400 (1991).
/d. at 403.
/d. at 409.
/d. at 415.
500 U.S. 614 (1991).

/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
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accident. 27 The defendant used two of its peremptory challenges to
excuse black jurors. 28 In response to Edmonson's appeal, the Supreme
Court extended the equal protection analysis to civil litigants because they
were state actors when they exercised their peremptory challenges. 29
Finally, the Court extended the race neutrality requirement in
peremptory challenges, which previously had applied only to the
prosecution in criminal cases, to criminal defendants in Georgia v.
McCollum. 30 This case involved two white defendants who were
indicted for aggravated assault and simple battery against two black
VICtims. The State filed a motion to prohibit them from exercising
peremptory challenges in a racially biased manner. 31 The trial court
denied the motion because "[n]either Georgia nor federal law prohibit[ed]
criminal defendants from exercising peremptory" challenges. 32 On
appeal, the Supreme Court held that, because the defendants were state
actors when exercising peremptory challenges, they, like the state, could
not exercise their challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. 33
III.

FAcrs

IN

STATE V. DAVIS

Although the race based peremptory challenge had a long history of
exclusion prior to State v. Davis, 34 the question of whether religiously
based peremptory challenges were improper had not been answered. The
defendant, Edward Lee Davis, was an African-American who was
charged with aggravated robbery. 35 During jury selection, no jurors
were challenged for cause, but the prosecutor used one of her three
peremptory challenges to excuse a black man from the panel. 36 The
defendant objected to the peremptory strike and asked for a race neutral
explanation. 37 The prosecutor explained that she had excused the juror
not because of the juror's race but because the juror was a Jehovah's

27. /d. at 616.
28. /d.
29. /d. at 630.
30. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
31. /d. at 2350.
32. /d. at 2352.
33. ld. at 2359. The Supreme Court has decided J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419
(1994), which held that gender based peremptory challenges are also unconstitutional.
Although the United States Supreme Court decision has relevance to the decision that this note
addresses, it does not form part of the background to the decision in this case because it was
decided after the Davis decision.
34. 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993).
35. ld. at 768.
36. /d.
37. /d.
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Witness. 38 The trial judge ruled that the peremptory strike would stand
because the prosecutor had given a race neutral explanation. 39 Davis
was convicted of the charges. 40
Davis appealed the conviction to the Minnesota Court of Appeals,
claiming that the trial court had abused its discretion by allowing a
religiously discriminatory peremptory challenge. 41 The appellate court
upheld the trial court's decision, and Davis appealed to the Minnesota
Supreme Court. 42
IV.

REASONING

Justice Simonett writing for the Minnesota Supreme Court began the
majority's analysis by arguing that Batson is only a limited exception to
the Swain decision. 43 He argued that the Batson holding was necessitated by the "serious and well-documented" abuse of the peremptory
challenge by prosecutors to exclude racial minorities from the jury. 44
Because Justice Simonett believed that the peremptory challenge had not
been used "common[ly] and flagrant[ly]" against religious groups, he
refused to extend the Batson decision to include religiously based
peremptory challenges. 45 He further argued that religiously motivated
peremptory challenges are more legitimate than race based challenges
since the reasons for the challenge are grounded in a juror's particular
beliefs which could affect how he or she would decide a case. 46
Finally, since "religious affiliation ... is not as self-evident as race or

38. The prosecutor explained that "it was highly significant to the state ... that the man
was a Jahovah [sic] Witness .... I would never, if I had a preemptory [sic] challenge left,
strike[-] or fail to strike a Jahovah [sic] Witness from my jury." ld.
39. ld.
40. Statev. Davis, No. C7-92-1037, 1993 WL 593, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 1993)
(unpublished opinion).
41. ld.
42. Jd.
43. Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 768.
44. Jd. at 770.
45. Jd. at 771.
46. The court explained:
Yet when religious beliefs translate into judgments on the merits of the cause to be
judged, it is difficult to distinguish, in challenging a juror, between an impermissible
bias on the basis of religious affiliation and a permissible religion-neutral explanation.
In the case before us, for example, would the explanation that the juror was "reluctant
to exercise authority over their fellow human beings" be sufficient to a prima facie
case of religious bias? A juror's religious beliefs are inviolate, but when they are the
basis for a person's moral values and produce societal views ... it would not seem
that a peremptory strike based on these societal views should be attributed to a
pernicious religious bias.
Id.
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gender," the court contended that disallowing religiously neutral
peremptory challenges would become too complicated to administer. 47
The court also recognized that the Powers decision, which gave the
litigant standing to sue on behalf of the juror, was based on two
significant policy considerations:
first, racially biased peremptory
challenges promote "cynicism respecting the jury's neutrality and its
obligation to adhere to the law;" 48 second, a juror excluded because of
race "suffer[s] a profound humiliation. " 49 The court conceded that these
two considerations logically lead to the extension of Batson's prohibition
against racially motivated challenges to include religiously motivated
peremptory challenges. so However, relying on its conclusion that
religiously based challenges were not used "purposefully to perpetrate
religious bigotry" 51 and on its understanding of the history of peremptory challenges, 52 the court refused to apply these considerations to the
Davis case. 53
The dissenting opinion by Justice Wahl argued that dicta issued in
several previous Supreme Court opinions supported an extension of
Batson to purposeful religious discrimination in peremptory challenges. 54
Justice Page joined Justice Wahl's dissent, and, in addition, argued that
Minnesota Statute section 593.32 would preclude a religiously motivated
peremptory strike. ss

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

ld.
ld. at 769 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412 (1991)).
ld.
ld. at 769.
ld. at 769-70.
ld. at 770.
The court stated:
If the life of the law were logic rather than experience, Batson might well be
extended to include religious bias and, for that matter, an endless number of other
biases. The question, however, is whether the peremptory strike has been
purposefully employed to perpetrate rei igious bigotry to the extent that the institutional
integrity of the jury has been impaired, and thus requiring further modification of the
traditional peremptory challenge.
!d. at 769-70.
54. ld. at 773. She argues that the opinions in Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348
(1991), and Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976), support the conclusion that religiously
motivated peremptory challenges should be suspect under the Batson rule. Davis, 504 N. W.2d
at 773 (Wahl, J., dissenting).
55. ld. at 774.

309]

STATE V. DAVIS

V.

315

ANALYSIS

A. The Minnesota Supreme Court Erred by not Requiring a
Religiously Neutral Explanation for the Peremptory Challenge
When the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to require a religiously
neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge by the prosecutor in this
case, it incorrectly analyzed Swain and Batson and failed to apply the
precedent of the United States Supreme Court. First, the court mischaracterized the Batson decision. Second, the court misanalyzed the
Batson decision's historical analysis of the peremptory challenge.
The Minnesota Supreme Court mischaracterized Batson when it
claimed that the decision was only a "limited exception" to Swain and,
therefore, must be analyzed in light of the Swain decision. 56 The
contention that Batson is only a "limited exception" to Swain is incorrect;
Batson actually overruled the Swain decision. 57
Even if the court's characterization were correct, its assumptions
about religiously based peremptory challenges were flawed. It claimed
that religiously based peremptory challenges were not as common as race
based peremptory challenges were before the Batson decision. In a
footnote, the court cited cases in which other courts found that religiously
motivated reasons constituted a sufficiently race neutral explanation to
overcome a Batson challenge. 58
The court explained that these cases demonstrated that religiously
based peremptory challenges had been upheld by other courts. The first
case was United States v. Clemmons. 59 It involved a man convicted of
selling stolen treasury bonds. The man claimed that the prosecution's
exclusion of Balhadra Das, a minority juror who appeared to be black (although he probably was Asian-Indian), was suspect and demanded a race
neutral explanation. 60 The prosecution explained that he struck the juror
because he was "Hindu in religion. " 61 The court upheld the prosecution's challenge because the religious reason given was a race neutral

56. /d. at 768.
57. The United States Supreme Court stated in reference to Batson, "Relying upon the
Equal Protection alone, we overruled Swain to the extent it foreclosed objections to the discriminatory use of peremptories in the course of a specific trial." Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,
405 (1991). See also Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2352 (1992) ("In Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986), the Court discarded Swain's evidentiary formulation.").
58. Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 771 n.3 ("There is authority that the religious beliefs of a
juror may provide a race-neutral reason for a Batson challenge.").
59. 892 F.2d 1153, 1154 (3rd Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990).
60. /d. at 1155-56.
61. /d. at 1156.
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explanation. 62 The other case the court cited, People v. Malone, 63
involved a defendant who was convicted of armed robbery. Three black
jurors were challenged by the prosecutor. 64
When the defendant
demanded a race neutral explanation, the prosecutor explained that he
excused one of the jurors because of "her religious convictions. " 65
Again the court that heard the case upheld the challenge. 66
Although the court undoubtedly cited these cases to support its
decision not to extend the Batson case, the cases indicate that striking a
juror because of religion is not an uncommon occurrence. 67 In fact, by
requiring race neutral explanations from prosecutors, the Batson case has
drawn attention to many religiously (not to mention gender) motivated
challenges. The Minnesota Supreme Court's own footnote severely
undermines its contention that religiously based peremptory challenges
are not a general problem in the peremptory challenge system.
The court also misanalyzed the Batson decision when it claimed that
the history of the peremptory challenge required the court to continue
allowing religiously based peremptory challenges. 68 The court argued
that since the randomness of the jury pool seems unfair, the peremptory
challenge system served to alleviate the jury pool's arbitrariness and ease
the minds of the litigants. 69 It further argued that because race based
peremptory challenges were so prevalent, they undermined the integrity
of the peremptory challenge and cast doubt on its fairness. 70 For that
reason, the court felt that the restrictions on peremptory challenges were
properly limited in cases involving racially motivated challenges. The
Davis court further argued that since religious discrimination in jury
selection was not as prevalent, it did not damage the jury system's
credibility and, therefore, the religiously based peremptory challenge
need not be limited. 71

62. /d. at 1157.
63. 570 N.E.2d 584, 586 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 584 N.E.2d 135 (Ill. 1991).
64. /d. at 588.
65. /d.
66. /d.
67. Another case involving a religious explanation given as a race neutral ground for
exclusion of a juror was Chambers v. State, 724 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). The case
involved a defendant convicted of burglary. /d. During the selection of the jury, four black
venireperson were excused by the prosecution. One of the challenged jurors was excluded
because he was a member of the Church of Christ which the prosecutor thought was "a little
bit away from the main stream." /d. at 442. Another excluded juror was challenged because
she was a Jehovalt's Witness. /d.
68. See State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 770 (Minn. 1993).
69. /d.
70. /d.
71. /d. at 771.

309]

STATE V. DAVIS

317

However, in finding against the defendant, the court emphasized the
widespread abuse of the race based peremptory challenges as its principal
vice72 but largely ignored the real vice of race based peremptory
challenges: these challenges are unfair per se. Using them casts doubt
on the peremptory challenge as a device to alleviate the jury pool's
unfairness and to ease the minds of litigants. 73 However, the perception
of unfairness applies equally to both religious based and race based
peremptory challenges whether or not religious based peremptory
challenges are used as frequently as race based challenges were. Just as
it does when an exclusion is based on race, the idea that a person may be
excused from jury service based on his or her religion casts a shadow of
unfairness on the jury process rather than building its esteem in the eyes
of the litigants and of the community. 74 However, the court contended
that religion is a more permissible ground for juror exclusion than race
because it forms the basis of personal beliefs that might legitimately lead
to exclusion from a jury. 75 This contention suggests that all members
of a particular religion think the same way on all issues. However, to
contend that all people of the same religion have identical beliefs and
therefore are unable to serve as impartial jurors and should be excluded
is to "accept as a defense to ... discrimination the very stereotype the
law condemns. " 76
Clearly, the Minnesota Supreme Court erred when it claimed that
Batson was a limited exception to Swain which should not be extended
to religiously based peremptory challenges. The question still remains
however whether the Batson decision should be applied in Davis.
Although the Batson decision did mention the violation of the juror's
equal protection rights, 77 it only held that a defendant would have a
legitimate claim if the claim were based on the prosecution's violation of
the defendant's equal protection right, not the juror's. 78

72. See id. at 770-71.
73. See id. Noticeably absent from the Minnesota Supreme Court's analysis is any
mention of the unfairness of the race based peremptory challenge. The analysis focuses instead
on its prevalence.
74. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994); Georgia v. McCollum, 112
S. Ct. 2348 (1991); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-4 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
75. See Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 771.
76. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427; Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991).
77. The Court stated, "As long as Strauder, therefore, the Court recognized that by
denying a person participation in jury service on account of his race, the State unconstitutionally discriminated against the excluded juror." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986).
78. See id. at 96.
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The Court did not decide that a defendant could assert a juror's equal
protection rights until the Powers decision. 79 The Court in Powers
declared that racial discrimination '"casts doubt on the integrity' ... and
fairness of a criminal proceeding" because the jury selection process was
intended to act as a "vital check" on the power of the state to discriminate. 80 The Court first argued that if discrimination is allowed in the
jury selection process, the public perceives that the process is unfair. 81
In the context of jury selection it is difficult to see how religious discrimination would be viewed by the public any differently then racial discrimination. 82 Both types of discrimination seem to be intolerable to most
Americans, 83 and both types of discrimination are prohibited by the
Constitution. 84
The second argument of the Court in Powers was that the juror who
is excluded "because of race suffers a profound personal humiliation
heightened by its public character. " 85 Again, the Davis opinion is
unclear about why a juror who is dismissed because of his or her religion
would not suffer the same public humiliation that the Court describes in
the context of racially motivated peremptory challenges. 86
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court in Davis conceded that
logically, it should apply the analysis of Powers to religiously motivated
peremptory challenges, 87 it still refused to do so based on its contention
that religiously based peremptory challenges were not as prevalent as race
motivated peremptories. Since this belief in the "limited" nature of
Batson was wrong, Powers must be applied. Consequently, the court
should have extended the requirements of Powers to religiously motivated
challenges because the exclusion of people from a jury based on religion

79. Powers, 499 U.S. at 415 ("We conclude that a defendant in a criminal case can raise
the third-party equal protection claims of jurors excluded by the jury because of race.").
80. ld. at 401.
81. ld.
82. See id. at 425 (Scalia, J., dissenting); State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 773 (Minn.
1993) (Walt!, J., dissenting); Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury
Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 725, 765 (1992).
83. America's long history of protecting against state involvement in religious affairs
seems to support this.
84. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
85. Powers, 499 U.S. at 413-14.
86. The Court never explained in Powers what causes the humiliation, or if the
humiliation only extends to those who have been dismissed because of race. See id. at 413.
The Court's extension of protection to sex-based discrimination seems to indicate that the
humiliation caused by exclusion is not limited only to race based challenges. See J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994).
87. State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 769 (Minn. 1993).
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causes public cynicism about the jury system and personal humiliation to
the excluded juror, just as it does for exclusions based on race.

B.

Requirement of Religiously Neutral Peremptory Challenges
Demonstrates the Illegitimacy ofBatson's Progeny

Although the Minnesota Supreme Court in Davis did not follow the
logic of the Powers decision, the Powers decision requires an extension
of the prohibition against racially discriminatory peremptory challenges
to religiously discriminatory challenges. 88 This natural and logical
extension of the recent United States Supreme Court jurisprudence
demonstrates the illegitimacy of the decisions: first, because the
jurisprudence conflicts with the purpose of the peremptory challenge; and
second, because the focus on the violation of the juror's equal protection
rights is a departure from sound logic and is administratively burdensome.

1.

Purpose of the peremptory challenge

Peremptory challenges have existed for a long time. 89 The English
common law recognized the right of the defense and the prosecution to
challenge jurors without any cause. 90 The United States, deriving the
practice from England, 91 also recognized the right to peremptory
challenges early in its history. 92 Although there is no Constitutional
guarantee to a peremptory challenge, "the challenge is 'one of the most
important of the rights secured to the accused. "' 93
The peremptory challenge, unlike challenges for cause, is exercised
"without a reason stated. " 94 It allows litigants to eliminate jurors based
on "sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices" 95 that have arisen
because of "[their] limited knowledge of [the jurors]. " 96 These sudden
impressions may be based on group affiliation. 97 The purpose of the
challenge is to allow the litigants the opportunity to "eliminate extremes
of partiality" and to select jurors who will decide the case "on the basis

88. See supra part V.A.
89. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-18 (1965).
90. /d. at 213.
91. /d. at 214.
92. /d.
93. /d. at 218 (quoting Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919)).
94. /d. at 220; Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 633 (1991)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
95. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892).
96. Swain, 380 U.S. at 221.
97. See id.
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of evidence placed before them. " 98 By allowing the litigant to challenge
those whom he or she fears will be unfair, the court system "fosters both
the perception and reality of an impartial jury. " 99
2.

Focus of equal protection analysis should be on the litigant

Adhering to the historical purpose of the peremptory challenge, the
United States Supreme Court in its early decisions focused on violations
of the defendant's equal protection rights. 100 It was not until Powers
that the Court extended the right of the defendant to assert the equal
protection claim of an excluded juror. 101 There are two problems with
the Powers approach, however. First, the juror focus appears logically
unsound. Second, the defendant's right to a fair trial is much more
important than the juror's right to equal protection in the jury selection
process.
In its early decisions, the Supreme Court focused on the litigant's
equal protection rights. In Strauder, the Court found that a statute
allowing only white men to serve on juries violated a black man's equal
protection rights. The Court explained:
It is not easy to comprehend how it can be said that while every white
man is entitled to a trial by a jury selected from persons of his own race
or color, or, rather, selected without discrimination against his color,
and a negro is not, the latter is equally protected by the law with the
former. 102

The reasoning seemed to be that because a white person had the right to
have the possibility of having a white person on his or her jury that a
black person should have the right to have the possibility of having a
black person on his or her jury. 103 In Batson, the Court continued to
emphasize the link between the race of the defendant and the race of the
juror when it required that "the defendant . . . must show that he is a

98. ld. at 218.
99. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 633 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
100. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) ("The defendant first must show
that he is a member of a cognizable racial group ... "); Swain, 380 U.S. at 223-24 (denying
an equal protection violation in a criminal case); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309
(1879) ("And how can it be maintained that compelling a colored man to submit to a trial for
his life by a jury drawn from a panel from which the State has expressly excluded every man
of his race, because of color alone, however well qualified in other respects, is not a denial to
him of equa11egal protection?").
101. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991).
102. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309.
103. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 419 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Cf Underwood, supra note
82, at 733-36.
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member of a cognizable group, and that the prosecutor has used
peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the
defendant's race. " 104 The Court suggested that if the litigant were not
allowed a jury that could include members of his or her race while other
litigants were allowed a jury that could include members of their race the
fairness of a jury panel was suspect.
Beginning in Powers, the Court allowed the litigant to assert the
juror's claim of an equal protection violation on a theory of third party
standing. 105 The Court claimed that barring the claim "because [the
petitioner's] race differs from that of the excluded jurors would be to
condone the arbitrary exclusion of citizens from the duty, honor, and
privilege of jury service. " 106 Subsequent to its decision in Powers, the
Court extended the right to challenge race based peremptories to private
litigants 107 and criminal defendants. 108 In addition, the Court extended the prohibition to include sex-based peremptories 109 based on the
juror's equal protection rights.
This recent shift in focus to the juror's equal protection rights
contravenes the sound policy of the Court's earlier decisions. The earlier
decisions focused on the litigant because allowing discrimination in the
jury selection process undermines the litigant's perception of fairness. no
It is difficult for a litigant to have faith in a process that excludes
members of his or her race from participating in the jury. The Swain and
Batson cases increased the litigant's perception of fairness by prohibiting
jury practices that discriminate against the litigant based on his or her
race.m Since historically the goal of the peremptory challenge was to
increase the litigant's perception of fairness in jury selection, the equal
protection analysis in those cases tended to restore the litigant's faith in
the peremptory challenge system by eliminating unfair application of it
against him or her.
In the Powers analysis, however, the fairness of the peremptory
system is not measured by how the litigant perceives the process but by

104. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
105. Powers, 499 U.S. at 415.
106. /d.
107. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 614 (1991).
108. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
109. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
110. See Edmonson, 500U.S. at633 (O'Connor,J., dissenting); Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 87 (1986); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
Ill. In the Swain case, the Court argued that the use of the challenge was "being perverted" when used to discriminate against black jurors. Swain, 380 U.S. at 223. In Batson the
Court stated, "Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant's
right to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to
secure." Batson, 476 U.S. at 86.
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its effect on the juror. 112 Rather than strengthening the litigant's
perception of fairness by invalidating procedures that discriminate against
him or her, the equal protection clause is used to invalidate jury selection
procedures that humiliate the excluded juror. 113 Since peremptory
challenges were not used to exclude jurors of the litigant's same race or
sex, 114 the litigant's faith is not undermined significantly because the
peremptory challenge has not been unfairly applied against him or
her. 115 Although the juror does have an actionable claim if he is
excluded from a jury because of his race, 116 the Court should not give
a litigant standing to sue on behalf of the juror, because the litigant's
perception of fairness has not been significantly diminished. Also, a
juror's perception of unfairness is a very weak ground upon which to
base standing.
The Court's continued focus on the violation of the juror's equal
protection rights has very serious consequences. By emphasizing the
juror's equal protection rights, the Court has subordinated the right of the
litigant to the right of the juror. For instance, since McCollum the Court
has recognized the right of the state to object to the peremptory challenges of a criminal defendant if they are racially motivated. 117 This
decision protects a juror from being humiliated and becoming cynical
about the fairness of the jury process while ignoring the defendant's right
to exclude jurors that he feels will unfairly judge his case.
There are two problems with the McCollum approach. The first
problem is that the decision ignores the purpose of the peremptory
challenge, which is to increase the litigant's perception of fairness.u 8
The second problem is that the juror's right to equal protection in jury
selection is placed above the litigant's right to a fair trial. 119 Justice

112. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 414 (1991) ("The rejected juror may lose
confidence in the court and its verdicts as may the defendant.").
113. Seeid.
114. Although the litigants in I.E. B. and Edmonson were members of the same excluded
group, the Court focused on the juror's equal protection rights. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114
S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994); Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 618-19.
115. In fact, at times the litigant that is being challenged for his or her peremptory strikes
is a criminal defendant who surely will not have an increase in faith about the fairness of the
peremptory strike system if his or her challenges are the ones being held to violate the equal
protection clause. See generally Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348,2348 (1992) (holding
that a criminal defendant cannot exercise race based peremptory challenges).
116. See Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
117. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2359 ("We hold that the Constitution prohibits a criminal
defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of
peremptory challenges.")
118. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 633 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
119. The juror also has standing to sue on his own behalf. See Caner, 396 U.S. 320.
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Thomas explained the significant problems with such an approach when
he wrote, "In effect, we have exalted the right of citizens to sit on juries
over the rights of the criminal defendant, even though it is the defendant,
not the jurors, who faces imprisonment or even death. " 120 By focusing
on the juror, the Court has given greater weight to the right of the party
with the least at stake in the trial process.
The focus on the juror's right also makes the peremptory challenge
unmanageable. By focusing on the juror's right, any party to a suit may
make a claim of purposeful exclusion and force a race neutral explanation.121 The number of Batson claims will consequently increase
significantly. 122 Also, uncertainty about the permissible use of the
peremptory challenge, may cause many litigants to refrain from
exercising otherwise legitimate challenges because they fear protracted
litigation over whether a juror's equal protection rights have been
violated. Since litigants will not be able to exclude jurors whom they
perceive to have a bias, they may lose faith in the fairness of the jury
selection process. 123 This result is exactly what the peremptory was
designed to avoid.
C.

Suggested Remedies to the Peremptory Problem

In order to alleviate the problems that the recent peremptory
challenge jurisprudence has created, the Court should return to a stricter
application of Batson. It should require that a litigant124 show that he

120. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring).
121. Since McCollum allows the state to protest exclusions that a criminal defendant
makes, 112 S. Ct. at 2359, Edmonson allows civil litigants to make a claim, 500 U.S. at 628,
Powers allows defendants who are not in the juror's cognizable group to make a claim on
behalf of the excluded juror, Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991), and J.E.B. extends
the Batson protection to women, J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994), a litigant could
always contend that the exclusion of a juror was based on the juror's sex/race and demand a
sex/race neutral explanation whether the litigant was the same sex/race or not. The
consequence is that any party can always force race neutral or gender-neutral explanations
because nothing but the group status of the juror is at issue.
122. Since 1986, four Batson claims have reached the Supreme Court. Before that,
peremptory challenge claims were relatively rare. Since the litigants can now claim third-party
standing to sue on behalf of jurors, the amount of claims will probably increase significantly.
The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized this potential when it stated, "If the life of the law
were logic rather than experience, Batson might well be extended to include religious bias and,
for that matter, an endless number of other biases." State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 769
(Minn. 1993). The United State Supreme Court has now extended the Batson protection to sex
discrimination in peremptory challenges. See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419.
123. See supra part V.B.l.
124. Because Edmonson applies Batson to civil litigants, a plaintiff or a defendant would
be able to make a Batson challenge. Although the Court focused on the jurors' rights in
Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 618-19, the plaintiff and the excluded jurors' were of the same race.
The outcome of the case, therefore, would have arguably been the same if the Court had
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is a member of a cognizable group, that the excluded juror is also a
member of that group, and that other facts give rise to a presumption that
the peremptory strike is based on that classification before the opposing
litigant must give a group-neutral explanation. 125 By doing this, the
litigant's equal protection rights are still protected. The Court can also
safely extend the Batson prohibition of race based peremptory challenges
to other suspect classifications, such as religion, because the standard for
determining violations of equal protection will be more manageable. 126
Although jurors' equal protection rights will not be safeguarded by the
litigant, 127 this rule retains manageability and will maintain the viability
of the peremptory challenge. If the Court continues to follow its recent
cases, the peremptory challenge process will likely become hopelessly
confused and unmanageable. 128
If the Minnesota Supreme Court in Davis would have followed the
Batson analysis its result would have been the same, but not because the
religiously motivated peremptory challenge was less flagrant or common
as the race based peremptory challenge. Since Davis was not of the same
religion as the excluded juror, his argument would have failed the first
tier of the Batson inquiry. The result would have been easier to reach
and the classification of religiously motivated peremptory challenges as
a more acceptable form of discrimination would have been avoided.
If the Court continues to feel that the juror's equal protection rights
are of predominant importance, the Court could simply eliminate
peremptory challenges, because the juror's rights will probably be best
protected by eliminating a process that fosters what the Court views as
unsavory discrimination. 129
Complete elimination of peremptory
challenges would better serve the Court's purpose of protecting juror's
equal protection rights in the jury selection process and prevent the

focused on the litigant's equal protection rights. The Ednwnson case also relies on theories of
state action which are outside of the scope of this note.
125. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
126. Since the only challengeable peremptory will be one which excludes a person who
is included in the litigant's cognizable group, the number of Batson challenges will decrease.
This also precludes the state in a criminal case from making a Batson challenge since the state
has no group characteristics. In other words, the state does not have an identifiable race,
religion, or sex.
127. The juror could still have a claim; however, he or she would have to raise it. See
Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Green County, 396 U.S. 320, 329-330 (1970).
128. See supra part V.B.2.
129. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 425 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ('"[l]rrelevant' personal characteristics are by definition the basis for using [peremptory challenges]
.... ");Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,220 (1965) ("It is no less frequently exercised on
grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race,
religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations ofpeop1e summoned for jury duty.").
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peremptory challenge jurisprudence from becoming confused and
irrational.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Minnesota Supreme Court misapplied the United States Supreme
Court equal protection analysis by not requiring religious neutral
explanations to peremptory challenges. The necessary extension of the
Powers analysis to the Davis case demonstrates the unworkability of the
United States Supreme Court peremptory challenge jurisprudence. The
Court's focus on jurors' equal protection rights ignores the purpose of
peremptory challenges and places jurors' rights above defendants.
Although one solution to the peremptory challenge would be to eliminate
the peremptory challenge, a better approach would be a return to a
stricter application of Batson by putting the focus of the equal protection
analysis back on the litigant. Such an approach would maintain the
litigant's equal protection rights while still maintaining the manageability
of the peremptory challenge system.
D. Scott Crook

